

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) The United States long-term domestic procurement strategy for PPE and solid oral dose essential drugs produced in the United States, including strategies to incentivize investment in and maintain United States supply chains for all such PPE and drugs sufficient to meet the needs of the United States during a public health emergency.

(B) An estimate of long-term demand quantities for all PPE items and solid oral dose essential drugs procured by the United States.

(C) Recommendations for congressional action required to implement the United States Government's procurement strategy.

(D) A determination whether all notifications, amendments, and other necessary actions have been completed to bring the United States existing international obligations into conformity with the statutory requirements of this subtitle.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A covered Secretary may transfer to the Strategic National Stockpile established under section 319F-2 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6b) any excess personal protective equipment or solid oral dose essential drugs acquired under a contract executed pursuant to subsection (b) or section 4154(b).

(2) TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY.—

(A) AMENDMENT.—Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: **“SEC. 529. TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT AND DRUGS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY.**

“(a) AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT.—During a public health emergency declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 319(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d(a)), the Secretary, at the request of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may transfer to the Department of Health and Human Services, on a reimbursable basis, excess personal protective equipment, medically necessary equipment, or solid oral dose essential drugs in the possession of the Department.

“(b) DETERMINATION BY SECRETARIES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out this section—

“(A) before requesting a transfer under subsection (a), the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall determine whether the personal protective equipment, medically necessary equipment, or solid oral dose essential drug is otherwise available; and

“(B) before initiating a transfer under subsection (a), the Secretary, in consultation with the heads of each component within the Department, shall—

“(i) determine whether the personal protective equipment, medically necessary equipment, or drug requested to be transferred under subsection (a) is excess equipment or drugs; and

“(ii) certify that the transfer of the personal protective equipment, medically necessary equipment, or solid oral dose essential drug will not adversely impact the health or safety of officers, employees, or contractors of the Department.

“(2) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary shall each submit to Congress a notification explaining the determination made under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, of paragraph (1).

“(3) REQUIRED INVENTORY.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—

“(i) acting through the Chief Medical Officer of the Department, maintain an inventory of all personal protective equipment, medically necessary equipment, and solid oral dose essential drugs in the possession of the Department; and

“(ii) make the inventory required under clause (i) available, on a continual basis, to—

“(I) the Secretary of Health and Human Services; and

“(II) the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

“(B) FORM.—Each inventory required to be made available under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

“(c) SOLID ORAL DOSE ESSENTIAL DRUGS.—In this section, the term ‘solid oral dose essential drug’ means a drug included on the most recent list of essential medicines issued by the Food and Drug Administration pursuant to Executive Order 13944 (85 Fed. Reg. 49929) that is available in a solid, oral dose form.”.

(B) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2135) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 528 the following:

“Sec. 529. Transfer of equipment and drugs during a public health emergency.”.

(3) STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE.—Section 319F-2(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(6) TRANSFERS OF ITEMS.—The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, may sell drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical devices, or other supplies maintained in the stockpile under paragraph (1) to a Federal agency or private, nonprofit, State, local, tribal, or territorial entity for immediate use and distribution, provided that any such items being sold are—

“(A) within 1 year of their expiration date; or

“(B) determined by the Secretary to no longer be needed in the stockpile due to advances in medical or technical capabilities.”.

(g) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—The President or the President's designee shall take all necessary steps, including invoking the rights of the United States under Article III of the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Government Procurement and the relevant exceptions of other relevant agreements to which the United States is a party, to ensure that the international obligations of the United States are consistent with the provisions of this subtitle.

SEC. 4154. REQUIREMENT OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS FOR DOMESTICALLY MANUFACTURED SOLID ORAL DOSE ESSENTIAL DRUGS.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Oversight and Reform, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) COVERED SECRETARY.—The term “covered Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

(3) SOLID ORAL DOSE ESSENTIAL DRUG.—The term “solid oral dose essential drug” means a drug included on the most recent list of essential medicines issued by the Food and Drug Administration pursuant to Executive Order 13944 (85 Fed. Reg. 49929) that is available in a solid, oral dose form.

(4) UNITED STATES.—The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.

(b) CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCTION.—Beginning 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, in order to ensure the sustainment and expansion of solid oral dose essential drug manufacturing in the United States and meet the needs of the current pandemic response, any contract for the procurement of solid oral dose essential drug entered into by a covered Secretary, or a covered Secretary's designee, shall—

(1) be issued for a duration of at least 2 years, plus all option periods necessary, to incentivize investment in the production of a solid oral dose essential drug and the ingredients thereof in the United States; and

(2) be for a solid oral dose essential drug, including the ingredients thereof, that is manufactured, processed, or packed in the United States.

(c) ALTERNATIVES TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTION.—The requirement under subsection (b) shall not apply to a solid oral dose essential drug, or an ingredient thereof if, after maximizing to the extent feasible sources consistent with subsection (b), the covered Secretary—

(1) maximizes sources for the solid oral dose essential drug that manufactured, processed, or packed outside the United States containing only ingredients that are available in the United States; and

(2) certifies every 120 days that it is necessary to procure the solid oral dose essential drug under alternative procedures to respond to the immediate needs of a public health emergency.

(d) AVAILABILITY EXCEPTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to a solid oral dose essential drug, or ingredient thereof—

(A) that is, or that includes, a material listed in section 25.104 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation as one for which a non-availability determination has been made; or

(B) as to which the covered Secretary determines that a sufficient quantity of a satisfactory quality that is manufactured, processed, or packed in the United States cannot be procured as, and when, needed at United States market prices.

(2) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The covered Secretary shall certify every 120 days that the exception under paragraph (1) is necessary to meet the immediate needs of a public health emergency.

SA 1577. Mr. MANCHIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes;

which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

Beginning on page 683, strike line 1 and all that follows through “as applicable” on page 776, line 1, and insert the following:

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 3112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:

(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.

(2) Anti-corruption.

(3) Rule of law.

(4) Human rights and labor rights.

(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

(6) Social and governance safeguards.

(7) Transparency.

(8) Environmental and energy standards.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the issues described in subsection (a).

SEC. 3113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Trade and Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze private sector investments around the world and to coordinate the deployment of United States Government technical assistance and development finance tools, including project preparation services and commercial advocacy.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the world’s infrastructure needs, including in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and growing;

(2) total or partial ownership or acquisition of, or a significant financial stake or physical presence in, certain types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners, and could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners;

(3) the United States must continue to prioritize support for infrastructure projects that are physically secure, financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially responsible;

(4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph (3) requires the coordination of all United States Government economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are deployed in a way to maximize United

States interests and that of its allies and partners;

(5) the GICC represents an important and concrete step towards better communication and coordination across the United States Government of economic tools relevant to supporting infrastructure that is physically secure, financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially responsible, and should be continued; and

(6) the executive branch and Congress should have consistent consultations on United States support for strategic infrastructure projects, including how Congress can support such initiatives in the future.

(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies that participate in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that identifies—

(1) current, pending, and future infrastructure projects, particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, that the United States is supporting or will support through financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other means;

(2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects; and

(3) a detailed description of any support provided by other United States allies and partners to such projects.

(d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 3114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.

(a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish an initiative, to be known as the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such development;

(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and

(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.

(b) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as—

(1) legal services;

(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.

(c) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline development, and other infrastructure project support.

(2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in coordination with the Department of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.

(3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support strategic infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, \$75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which \$20,000,000 is to be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 3115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including support to companies incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of developing countries.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;

(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese financial institutions;

(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and

(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact other countries.

(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to—

- (1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;
- (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent energy markets;
- (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and
- (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

SEC. 3116. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the Secretary of State through the Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources and the Assistant Secretary for the Office of International Affairs of the Department of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the economic and national security interests of the United States and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;

(2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);

(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and implications for United States national interests and the interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing country energy production or transmission; and

(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the United States and such countries.

(b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in subsection (a) shall be published on the United States Agency for International Development's website.

Subtitle C—Digital Technology and Connectivity

SEC. 3121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

(a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.

(b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital authoritarianism”).

(c) NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS OR ARRANGEMENTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Trade Representative should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating to digital goods with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-shar-

ing alliance, and other nations, as appropriate.

(d) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication.

(e) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

(f) FORMATION OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY TRADE ALLIANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should examine opportunities for diplomatic negotiations regarding the formation of mutually beneficial alliances relating to digitally-enabled technologies and services.

SEC. 3122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

(a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—

(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

(2) protect technological assets, including data;

(3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

(4) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services and increase United States company market share in target markets;

(5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC imports; and

(6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best practices for a national approach to cybersecurity.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan for the coming year to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).

(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the action plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with—

(1) the appropriate congressional committees;

(2) leaders of the United States industry;

(3) other relevant technology experts, including the Open Technology Fund;

(4) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and

(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

(d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the implementation of the plan required by subsection (b).

(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated

\$100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 3123. STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for support of private sector digital investment that—

(1) includes support for information-connectivity projects, including projects relating to telecommunications equipment, mobile payments, smart cities, and undersea cables;

(2) in providing such support, prioritizes private sector projects—

(A) of strategic value to the United States;

(B) of mutual strategic value to the United States and allies and partners of the United States; and

(C) that will advance broader development priorities of the United States;

(3) helps to bridge the digital gap in less developed countries and among women and minority communities within those countries;

(4) facilitates coordination, where appropriate, with multilateral development banks and development finance institutions of other countries with respect to projects described in paragraph (1), including through the provision of co-financing and co-guarantees; and

(5) identifies the human and financial resources available to dedicate to such projects and assesses any constraints to implementing such projects.

(b) LIMITATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may not provide support for projects in which entities described in paragraph (2) participate.

(2) ENTITIES DESCRIBED.—An entity described in this subparagraph is an entity based in, or owned or controlled by the government of, a country, including the People's Republic of China, that does not protect internet freedom of expression and privacy.

Subtitle D—Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence

SECTION 3131. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence Act”.

SEC. 3132. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.

(a) COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.

(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND APPROVAL.—

(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official of the Department at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).

(2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this division;

(B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based on a determination that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies as appropriate;

(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and

(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that align with subsection (d) of this section.

(3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to—

(A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and

(B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming functions in concert with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence and activities of the Chinese Communist Party.

(4) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate a senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist and consult with the senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that—

(1) undermine a free and open international order;

(2) advance an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;

(3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the United States or other countries; or

(4) undermine the economic security of the United States or other countries, including by promoting corruption.

(e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, countering malign influence

through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include efforts to—

(1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;

(2) support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative and associated initiatives;

(3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;

(4) encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;

(5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the People’s Republic of China;

(6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda, including through programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and

(7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models.

SEC. 3133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE AND MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In the report to Congress required under section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), the President laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and its agents and entities, including—

(A) propaganda and disinformation, in which “Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run television, print, radio, and online organizations whose presence is proliferating in the United States and around the world”;

(B) malign political influence operations, particularly “front organizations and agents which target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local state and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse”;

(C) malign financial influence operations, characterized as the “misappropriation of technology and intellectual property, failure to appropriately disclose relationships with foreign government sponsored entities, breaches of contract and confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair and merit-based allocation of Federal research and development funding”.

(2) Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations are ongoing. In January 2019, then-Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, “China will continue to use legal, political, and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese markets—to shape the information environment. It is also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.”.

(3) In February 2020, then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the People’s Republic of China has “very active [malign] foreign influence efforts in this country,” with the goal of “trying to shift

our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China on a variety of issues”.

(4) The PRC’s information warfare and malign influence operations continue to adopt new tactics and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, then-Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian and Chinese narratives surrounding COVID-19 and that the GEC had “uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts” that it assessed was “created with the intent to amplify Chinese propaganda and disinformation”. In June 2020, Google reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.

(5) Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations are a threat to the national security, democracy, and economic systems of the United States and its allies and partners. In October 2018, Vice President Michael R. Pence warned that “Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.”.

(6) In February 2018, then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the open research and development environments of United States institutions of higher education to utilize “professors, scientists and students” as “nontraditional collectors” of information.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL DUTIES.—The President shall—

(1) protect our democratic institutions and processes from malign influence from the People’s Republic of China and other foreign adversaries; and

(2) consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter PRC and other foreign information warfare and malign influence operations without delay, including—

(A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), which authorizes a coordinator position within the National Security Council for countering malign foreign influence operations and campaigns;

(B) section 228 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92), which authorizes additional research of foreign malign influence operations on social media platforms;

(C) section 847 of such Act, which requires the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting regulations regarding vetting for foreign ownership, control and influence in order to mitigate risks from malign foreign influence;

(D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires an update of the comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of malign influence to include the People’s Republic of China;

(E) section 5323 of such Act, which authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to detect and study information warfare and malign influence operations across social media platforms; and

(F) section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence Response Center inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

SEC. 3134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.

There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2021, \$105,500,000, to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 3135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged governments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate”.

(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers also make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12 percent based on sector—of the biomedical field.

(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the United States, projected to represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in the United States and around the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;

(2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders;

(3) the United States Government should encourage other foreign governments to use the official and scientific names for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and

(4) the United States Government and other governments around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 3136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The PRC is increasing its spending on public diplomacy including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments into state-sponsored media publications outside of the PRC. These include, for example, more than \$10,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment in communications infrastructure, platforms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to the PRC for training programs.

(2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), and UFWD’s many affiliates and proxies, has obtained unfettered access to radio, tele-

vision, and digital dissemination platforms in numerous languages targeted at citizens in other regions where the PRC has an interest in promoting public sentiment in support of the Chinese Communist Party and expanding the reach of its misleading narratives and propaganda.

(3) Even in Western democracies, the PRC spends extensively on influence operations, such as a \$500,000,000 advertising campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and a more than \$20,000,000 campaign to influence United States public opinion via the China Daily newspaper supplement.

(4) Radio Free Asia (referred to in this subsection as “RFA”), a private nonprofit multimedia news corporation, which broadcasts in 9 East Asian languages including Mandarin, Uyghur, Cantonese, and Tibetan, has succeeded in its mission to reach audiences in China and in the Central Asia region despite the Chinese Government’s—

(A) efforts to practice “media sovereignty,” which restricts access to the free press within China; and

(B) campaign to spread disinformation to countries abroad.

(5) In 2019, RFA’s Uyghur Service alerted the world to the human rights abuses of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(6) Gulchehra Hoja, a Uyghur journalist for RFA, received the International Women’s Media Foundation’s Courage in Journalism Award and a 2019 Magnitsky Human Rights Award for her coverage of Xinjiang, while the Chinese Government detained and harassed Ms. Hoja’s China-based family and the families of 7 other RFA journalists in retaliation for their role in exposing abuses.

(7) In 2019 and 2020, RFA provided widely disseminated print and digital coverage of the decline in freedom in Hong Kong and the student-led protests of the extradition law.

(8) In March 2020, RFA exposed efforts by the Chinese Government to underreport the number of fatalities from the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan Province, China.

(b) THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities shall undertake the following actions to support independent journalism, counter disinformation, and combat surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist Party and other malign actors are promoting disinformation, propaganda, and manipulated media markets:

(1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand domestic coverage and digital programming for all RFA China services and other affiliate language broadcasting services.

(2) USAGM shall increase funding for RFA’s Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language services.

(3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian language propaganda and misinformation.

(4) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose and counter false CCP narratives.

(5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and expand its work to support tools and technology to circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP, both inside the PRC as well as abroad where the PRC has exported censorship technology, and increase secure peer-to-peer connectivity and privacy tools.

(6) Voice of America shall continue and review opportunities to expand its mission of providing timely, accurate, and reliable news, programming, and content about the

United States, including news, culture, and values.

(7) The networks and grantees of the United States Agency for Global Media shall continue their mission of providing credible and timely news coverage inclusive of the People’s Republic of China’s activities in Xinjiang, including China’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity with respect to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including through strategic amplification of Radio Free Asia’s coverage, in its news programming in majority-Muslim countries.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United States Agency for Global Media, \$100,000,000 for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat Chinese disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs, of which—

(1) not less than \$70,000,000 shall be directed to a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;

(2) not less than \$20,000,000 shall be used to serve populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services; and

(3) not less than \$5,500,000 shall be used for digital media services—

(A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese populations in foreign countries; and

(B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in China through “Global Mandarin” programming.

(d) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Chief Executive Office of the United States Agency for Global Media, in consultation with the President of the Open Technology Fund, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that outlines—

(A) the amount of funding appropriated pursuant to subsection (c) that was provided to the Open Technology Fund for purposes of circumventing Chinese Communist Party censorship of the internet within the borders of the People’s Republic of China; and

(B) the progress that has been made in developing the technology referred to in subparagraph (A), including an assessment of whether the funding provided was sufficient to achieve meaningful penetration of People’s Republic of China’s censors; and

(C) the impact of Open Technology Fund tools on piercing Chinese Communist Party internet censorship efforts, including the metrics used to measure that impact and the trajectory of that impact over the previous 5 years.

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall support and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative, the PRC’s surveillance and digital export of technology, and other influence operations abroad direct or indirectly supported by the Communist Party or the Chinese government.

(f) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the

Department of State, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, \$170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

SEC. 3137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

(a) **FINDING.**—Congress established the Global Engagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts” of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation globally”.

(b) **EXTENSION.**—Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

(c) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and from combatant commands.

(d) **HIRING AUTHORITY.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State, during the five year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and solely to carry out functions of the Global Engagement Center, may—

(1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the competitive service; and

(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(e) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated \$150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 3138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

(a) **AMENDMENTS TO DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950.**—

(1) **DEFINITION OF COVERED TRANSACTION.**—Subsection (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565) is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (A)—

(i) in clause (i), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

“(iii) any transaction described in subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending after the date of the enactment of the China Strategic Competition Act of 2021.”;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the following:

“(vi) Any gift to an institution of higher education from a foreign person, or the entry into a contract by such an institution with a foreign person, if—

“(I)(aa) the value of the gift or contract equals or exceeds \$1,000,000; or

“(bb) the institution receives, directly or indirectly, more than one gift from or enters into more than one contract, directly or indirectly, with the same foreign person for the same purpose the aggregate value of which, during the period of 2 consecutive calendar years, equals or exceeds \$1,000,000; and

“(II) the gift or contract—

“(aa) relates to research, development, or production of critical technologies and provides the foreign person potential access to

any material nonpublic technical information (as defined in subparagraph (D)(iii)) in the possession of the institution; or

“(bb) is a restricted or conditional gift or contract (as defined in section 117(h) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(h))) that establishes control.”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(G) **FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**—For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):

“(i) **CONTRACT.**—The term ‘contract’ means any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or services by a foreign person, for the direct benefit or use of either of the parties.

“(ii) **GIFT.**—The term ‘gift’ means any gift of money or property.

“(iii) **INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**—The term ‘institution of higher education’ means any institution, public or private, or, if a multicampus institution, any single campus of such institution, in any State—

“(I) that is legally authorized within such State to provide a program of education beyond secondary school;

“(II) that provides a program for which the institution awards a bachelor’s degree (or provides not less than a 2-year program which is acceptable for full credit toward such a degree) or a more advanced degree;

“(III) that is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association; and

“(IV) to which the Federal Government extends Federal financial assistance (directly or indirectly through another entity or person), or that receives support from the extension of Federal financial assistance to any of the institution’s subunits.”.

(2) **MANDATORY DECLARATIONS.**—Subsection (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following: “Such regulations shall require a declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).”.

(3) **FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.**—Subsection (f) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (10), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph (12); and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the following:

“(11) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to covered transactions described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at institutions of higher education in the United States; and”.

(4) **MEMBERSHIP OF CFIUS.**—Subsection (k) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (2)—

(i) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K), respectively; and

(ii) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following:

“(H) In the case of a covered transaction involving an institution of higher education (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of Education.”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(8) **INCLUSION OF OTHER AGENCIES ON COMMITTEE.**—In considering including on the Committee under paragraph (2)(K) the heads of other executive departments, agencies, or offices, the President shall give due consideration to the heads of relevant research and science agencies, departments, and offices, including the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the Director of the National Science Foundation.”.

(5) **CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.**—Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(D) an evaluation of whether there are foreign malign influence or espionage activities directed or directly assisted by foreign governments against institutions of higher education (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtaining research and development methods or secrets related to critical technologies; and

“(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation for any changes to, reviews conducted under this section that relate to institutions of higher education, based on an analysis of disclosure reports submitted to the chairperson under section 117(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).”.

(b) **INCLUSION OF CFIUS IN REPORTING ON FOREIGN GIFTS UNDER HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.**—Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting after “the Secretary” the following: “and the Secretary of the Treasury (in the capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States under section 721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(k)(3)))”; and

(2) in subsection (d)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking “with the Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury”; and

(ii) by striking “to the Secretary” and inserting “to each such Secretary”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “with the Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury”.

(c) **EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall—

(1) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and (e); and

(2) apply with respect to any covered transaction the review or investigation of which is initiated under section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after the date that is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Register of the notice required under subsection (e)(2).

(d) **REGULATIONS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (in this section referred to as the “Committee”), which shall include the Secretary of Education for purposes of this subsection, shall prescribe regulations as necessary and appropriate to implement the amendments made by subsection (a).

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) regulations accounting for the burden on institutions of higher education likely to result from compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a), including structuring penalties and filing fees to reduce such burdens, shortening timelines for reviews and investigations, allowing for simplified and streamlined declaration and notice requirements, and implementing any procedures necessary to protect academic freedom; and

(B) guidance with respect to—

(i) which gifts and contracts described in described in clause (vi)(II)(aa) of subsection (a)(4)(B) of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1), would be subject to filing mandatory declarations under subsection (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV) of that section; and

(ii) the meaning of “control”, as defined in subsection (a) of that section, as that term applies to covered transactions described in

clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that section, as added by subsection (a)(1).

(3) **ISSUANCE OF FINAL RULE.**—The Committee shall issue a final rule to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a) after assessing the findings of the pilot program required by subsection (e).

(e) **PILOT PROGRAM.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Register of the matter required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 570 days thereafter, the Committee shall conduct a pilot program to assess methods for implementing the review of covered transactions described in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1).

(2) **PROPOSED DETERMINATION.**—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish in the Federal Register—

(A) a proposed determination of the scope of and procedures for the pilot program required by paragraph (1);

(B) an assessment of the burden on institutions of higher education likely to result from compliance with the pilot program;

(C) recommendations for addressing any such burdens, including shortening timelines for reviews and investigations, structuring penalties and filing fees, and simplifying and streamlining declaration and notice requirements to reduce such burdens; and

(D) any procedures necessary to ensure that the pilot program does not infringe upon academic freedom.

(3) **REPORT ON FINDINGS.**—Upon conclusion of the pilot program required by paragraph (1), the Committee shall submit to Congress a report on the findings of that pilot program that includes—

(A) a summary of the reviews conducted by the Committee under the pilot program and the outcome of such reviews;

(B) an assessment of any additional resources required by the Committee to carry out this section or the amendments made by subsection (a);

(C) findings regarding the additional burden on institutions of higher education likely to result from compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a) and any additional recommended steps to reduce those burdens; and

(D) any recommendations for Congress to consider regarding the scope or procedures described in this section or the amendments made by subsection (a).

SEC. 3139. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SENATE-CONFIRMED OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Congress and the executive branch have recognized the importance of preventing and mitigating the potential for conflicts of interest following government service, including with respect to senior United States officials working on behalf of foreign governments; and

(2) Congress and the executive branch should jointly evaluate the status and scope of post-employment restrictions.

(b) **RESTRICTIONS.**—Section 841 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(i) **EXTENDED POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS FOR CERTAIN SENATE-CONFIRMED OFFICIALS.**—

“(1) **SECRETARY OF STATE AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE.**—With respect to a person serving as the Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary of State, the restrictions described in section 207(f)(1) of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to representing, aiding, or

advising a foreign governmental entity before an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States at any time after the termination of that person’s service as Secretary or Deputy Secretary.

“(2) **UNDER SECRETARIES, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES, AND AMBASSADORS.**—With respect to a person serving as an Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, or Ambassador at the Department of State or the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the restrictions described in section 207(f)(1) of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to representing, aiding, or advising a foreign governmental entity before an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States for 3 years after the termination of that person’s service in a position described in this paragraph, or the duration of the term or terms of the President who appointed that person to their position, whichever is longer.

“(3) **PENALTIES AND INJUNCTIONS.**—Any violations of the restrictions in paragraphs (1) or (2) shall be subject to the penalties and injunctions provided for under section 216 of title 18, United States Code.

“(4) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this subsection:

“(A) The term ‘foreign governmental entity’ includes any person employed by—

“(i) any department, agency, or other entity of a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level;

“(ii) any governing party or coalition of a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level; or

“(iii) any entity majority-owned or majority-controlled by a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level.

“(B) The term ‘representation’ does not include representation by an attorney, who is duly licensed and authorized to provide legal advice in a United States jurisdiction, of a person or entity in a legal capacity or for the purposes of rendering legal advice.

“(5) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The restrictions in this subsection shall apply only to persons who are appointed by the President to the positions referenced in this subsection on or after 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021.

“(6) **NOTICE OF RESTRICTIONS.**—Any person subject to the restrictions of this subsection shall be provided notice of these restrictions by the Department of State upon appointment by the President, and subsequently upon termination of service with the Department of State.”.

SEC. 3140. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITIZING NOMINATION OF QUALIFIED AMBASSADORS TO ENSURE PROPER DIPLOMATIC POSITIONING TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE.

It is the sense of Congress that it is critically important for the President to nominate qualified ambassadors as quickly as possible, especially for countries in Central and South America, to ensure that the United States is diplomatically positioned to counter Chinese influence efforts in foreign countries.

SEC. 3141. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.**—The term “qualified research entity” means an entity that—

(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a federally funded research and development center;

(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to write the report required under subsection (c); and

(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such report or cre-

ate a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with—

(i) the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

(iii) any company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary of such company; or

(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the People’s Republic of China that is believed to have a substantial financial or commercial interest in the People’s Republic of China.

(2) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(b) **CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the “China Censorship Monitor and Action Group” (referred to in this subsection as the “Task Force”).

(2) **MEMBERSHIP.**—The President shall—

(A) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council;

(B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and

(C) direct the head of each of the following executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to participate in the Task Force:

(i) The Department of State.

(ii) The Department of Commerce.

(iii) The Department of the Treasury.

(iv) The Department of Justice.

(v) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.

(vi) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

(vii) The Federal Communications Commission.

(viii) The United States Agency for Global Media.

(ix) Other agencies designated by the President.

(3) **RESPONSIBILITIES.**—The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and execution of an integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions or territories, any United States person, including United States companies that conduct business in the People’s Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; and

(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(4) **MEETINGS.**—The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.

(5) **CONSULTATIONS.**—The Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—

(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the Task Force;

(B) independent agencies of the United States Government that are not represented on the Task Force;

(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the media; and

(D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies and partners facing similar challenges related to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(6) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Task Force shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes, with respect to the reporting period—

(i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued by the Task Force to address the challenges of censorship and intimidation of United States persons while in the United States or any of its possessions or territories, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in support of the strategic objectives and policies referred to in clause (i); and

(iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of such activities on the national interests of the United States.

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(C) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the activities of the Task Force to execute the strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).

(C) REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

(1) REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter into an agreement with a qualified research entity that is independent of the Department of State to write a report on censorship and intimidation in the United States and its possessions and territories of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall—

(i) assess major trends, patterns, and methods of the Government of the People's Republic of China's efforts to direct or directly support censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech;

(ii) assess, including through the use of illustrative examples, as appropriate, the impact on and consequences for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, that criticize—

(I) the Chinese Communist Party;

(II) the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(III) the authoritarian model of government of the People's Republic of China; or

(IV) a particular policy advanced by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(iii) identify the implications for the United States of the matters described in clauses (i) and (ii);

(iv) assess the methods and evaluate the efficacy of the efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to limit freedom of expression in the private sector, including media, social media, film, education, travel, financial services, sports and enter-

tainment, technology, telecommunication, and internet infrastructure interests;

(v) include policy recommendations for the United States Government, including recommendations regarding collaboration with United States allies and partners, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China; and

(vi) include policy recommendations for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in China, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(C) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent practicable, the report required under subparagraph (A) should identify implications and policy recommendations that are relevant to United States allies and partners facing censorship and intimidation directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit the report written by the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate congressional committees.

(B) PUBLICATION.—The report referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

(3) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State and other Federal agencies selected by the President shall provide the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) with timely access to appropriate information, data, resources, and analyses necessary for such entity to write the report described in paragraph (1)(A) in a thorough and independent manner.

(d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 3201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 3202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-minded countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), which are essential to further shared interests;

(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;

(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken collective ability to advance shared interests;

(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), titled “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more frequent;

(8) the United States should continue to engage on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas of—

(A) forecasting environmental challenges;

(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking water;

(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and

(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing resilience; and

(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions needed—

(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on strategic interests of the United States and partners and allies of the United States in the region; and

(B) to address humanitarian and food security impacts of weather-related changes in the region.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space,

cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

(2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

(A) defending Japan, including all areas under the administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan;

(B) defending the Republic of Korea under article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea;

(C) defending the Philippines under article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines;

(D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and

(E) defending Australia under article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;

(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States' bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

(4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

SEC. 3203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should reaffirm our commitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (the “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of law, and market-driven economic growth, and is free from undue influence and coercion;

(2) the United States should seek to expand sustained dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience;

(3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including more regular military-to-military dialogues, joint exercises, and coordinated policies related to shared interests such as protecting cyberspace and advancing maritime security;

(4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

(5) building upon their partnership to help finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, including through partnerships with other multilateral development banks, should also venture to finance development

and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are sustainable and offer a viable alternative to the investments of the People's Republic of China in that region under the Belt and Road Initiative;

(6) in consultation with other Quad countries, the President should establish clear deliverables for the 3 new Quad Working Groups established on March 12, 2021, which are—

(A) the Quad Vaccine Experts Working Group;

(B) the Quad Climate Working Group; and

(C) the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group; and

(7) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group could—

(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of issues; and

(B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

SEC. 3204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the United States, known as the “Quad”) with the goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting on the recommendations of the Quad Working Groups described in section 203(6) and to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.

(b) UNITED STATES GROUP.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the governments of the Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be established a United States Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.

(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of Congress appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph (A)—

(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from among Members of the House, not less than 4 of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and

(ii) half shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based on recommendations of the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate, from among Members of the Senate, not less than 4 of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the majority leader and minority leader determine otherwise).

(3) MEETINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than annually with representatives and appropriate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad countries.

(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in subparagraph (A) may be held—

(i) in the United States;

(ii) in another Quad country during periods when Congress is not in session; or

(iii) virtually.

(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from

the House from among members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the Senate from among members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.

(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation from the House of Representatives and half of the amount shall be available to the delegation from the Senate.

(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The amounts available to the delegations of the House of Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved by the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives and the chairperson of the delegation from the Senate, respectively.

(6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States Group may accept gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the Senate.

(7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives or the chairperson of the delegation from the Senate of the United States Group shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.

(8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, which shall include a description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

SEC. 3205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;

(2) support high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's poorest countries;

(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and India;

(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment

to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in the region;

(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and stability in the region;

(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;

(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;

(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in international law; and

(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;

(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;

(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to refugees and migrants;

(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;

(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN countries, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;

(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;

(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);

(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global challenges of the future;

(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;

(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council resolutions and international agreements with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to do the same; and

(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 3206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-ASEAN COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment critical to strategic technologies and critical infrastructure;

(2) the United States and ASEAN should share information about and collaborate on screening Chinese investments in strategic technology sectors and critical infrastructure;

(3) the United States and ASEAN should work together on appropriate import restriction regimes regarding Chinese exports of surveillance technologies;

(4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;

(5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries regarding "Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace", a set of commitments that support the "rules-based international order, affirm the applicability of international law to state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and the development and implementation of practical confidence building measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber incidents"; and

(6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese investments in critical technology, including artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the coming decades.

SEC. 3207. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the expanded influence of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.

(b) **CONTENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall include analysis of the following:

(1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist Party in international organiza-

tions and how that influence has expanded over the last 10 years, including—

(A) tracking countries' voting patterns that align with Chinese government voting patterns;

(B) the number of PRC nationals in leadership positions at the D-1 level or higher;

(C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory funding by organization;

(D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party phrases and initiatives in international organization language and programming;

(E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy for its own foreign policy initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative;

(F) the number of Junior Professional Officers that the Government of the People's Republic of China has funded by organization;

(G) tactics used by the Government of the People's Republic of China or the CCP to manipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting measures, voting bodies, or votes;

(H) the extent to which technology companies incorporated in the PRC, or which have PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide equipment and services to international organizations; and

(I) efforts by the PRC's United Nations Mission to generate criticism of the United States in the United Nations, including any efforts to highlight delayed United States payments or to misrepresent total United States voluntary and assessed financial contributions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and programs.

(2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded influence of the PRC government and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations, including an analysis of PRC Government and Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and rhetoric.

(3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC government and the Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence in international organizations, including—

(A) incentive programs for PRC nationals to join and run for leadership positions in international organizations;

(B) coercive economic and other practices against other members in the organization; and

(C) economic or other incentives provided to international organizations, including donations of technologies or goods.

(4) The successes and failures of the PRC government and Chinese Communist Party influence efforts in international organizations, especially those related to human rights, "internet sovereignty", the development of norms on artificial intelligence, labor, international standards setting, and freedom of navigation.

(c) **FORM.**—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) **DEFINITION.**—In this section, the term "international organizations" includes the following:

- (1) The African Development Bank.
- (2) The Asian Development Bank.
- (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
- (4) The Bank of International Settlements.
- (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.
- (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.
- (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.

(8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

(9) The International Bureau of Weights and Measures.

(10) The International Chamber of Commerce.

(11) The International Civil Aviation Organization.

(12) The International Criminal Police Organization.

(13) The International Finance Corporation.

(14) The International Fund for Agricultural Development.

(15) The International Hydrographic Organization.

(16) The International Labor Organization.

(17) The International Maritime Organization.

(18) The International Monetary Fund.

(19) The International Olympic Committee.

(20) The International Organization for Migration.

(21) The International Organization for Standardization.

(22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.

(23) The International Telecommunications Union.

(24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

(25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

(26) The United Nations.

(27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

(28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

(29) The United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

(30) The United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

(31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

(32) The Universal Postal Union.

(33) The World Customs Organization.

(34) The World Health Organization.

(35) The World Intellectual Property Organization.

(36) The World Meteorological Organization.

(37) The World Organization for Animal Health.

(38) The World Tourism Organization.

(39) The World Trade Organization.

(40) The World Bank Group.

SEC. 3208. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and organizations—

(1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and implementation;

(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;

(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of regulations and regulatory practices;

(4) to build consensus around industry and technical standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global economic growth and commerce; and

(5) to promote United States standards regarding environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.

(b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize—

(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States;

(2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where greater regulatory coherence,

harmonization of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States, including with—

(A) the European Union;

(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;

(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);

(D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and

(E) multilateral development banks; and

(3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.

(c) PARTICIPATION BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.—With regard to the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives, and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation advances the goals of such program.

(d) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE SECRETARY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment.

(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

(2) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may make available amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that—

(A) facilitates participation by representatives from technical agencies within the United States Government and their counterparts; and

(B) complies with applicable procedural requirements under the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

SEC. 3209. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to lead new technology policy partnerships focused on the shared interests of the world's technology-leading democracies.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office (referred to in this section as the “Office”), which shall be housed in the Department of State.

(c) LEADERSHIP.—

(1) AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.—The Office shall be headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall—

(A) be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;

(B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and

(C) report to the Secretary of State, unless otherwise directed.

(2) OFFICE LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Energy shall each appoint, from within their respective departments at the level of GS-14 or higher, liaisons between the Office and the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, or the Department of Energy, as applicable

SA 1578. Mr. MANCHIN (for himself, Mrs. CAPITO, Mr. GRASSLEY, and Ms. ERNST) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to

the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 188, strike lines 2 through 25 and insert the following:

(a) CRITICAL MINERALS MINING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to support supply chain resiliency, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the National Laboratories (as defined in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801)), in coordination with the Director, shall issue awards, on a competitive basis, to institutions of higher education or nonprofit organizations (or consortia of such institutions or organizations) to support basic research that will accelerate innovation to advance critical minerals mining strategies and technologies for the purpose of making better use of domestic resources and eliminating national reliance on minerals and mineral materials that are subject to supply disruptions.

(2) USE OF FUNDS.—Activities funded by an award under this section may include—

(A) advancing mining research and development activities to develop new mapping and mining technologies and techniques, including advanced critical mineral extraction and production, to improve existing or to develop new supply chains of critical minerals, and to yield more efficient, economical, and environmentally benign mining practices;

(B) advancing critical mineral processing and geochemical

SA 1579. Mr. MANCHIN (for himself, Mr. BURR, and Ms. HASSAN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title III of division F, insert the following:

SEC. 63. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLE BATTERIES AND ELECTRIC VEHICLE BATTERY COMPONENTS.

It is the sense of Congress that the Federal Government and public and private institutions in the United States should pursue a national strategy for the responsible sourcing of electric vehicle batteries and electric vehicle battery components that includes the following goals:

(1) Increasing the extraction and processing of critical materials for electric vehicle batteries in the United States.

(2) Increasing the recycling of electric vehicle batteries in the United States.

(3) Preventing the use or procurement of electric vehicles with batteries or battery components that are processed, extracted, or manufactured in China.

(4) Preventing the use or procurement of electric vehicles with batteries or battery components that are processed, extracted, or manufactured using forced or child labor.